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The Role of Knowhow Acquisition in the
Formation and Duration of Joint Ventures
Michel A. Habib
Swiss Banking Institute, University of Zurich
Pierre Mella-Barral
Department of Finance and Economics, HEC School of
Management Paris
We analyze the role of knowhow acquisition in the formation and duration of joint
ventures. Two parties become partners in a joint venture to benefit from each other’s
knowhow. Joint operations provide each party with the opportunity to acquire part
of its partner’s knowhow. A party’s increased knowhow provides the impetus for the
dissolution of the joint venture. We characterize the conditions under which dissolu-
tion takes place, identify the party that buys out its partner, determine the time to
dissolution, establish its comparative statics, and examine the implications of knowl-
edge acquisition for the desirability of joint venture formation. (JEL code: G34)
Dyer, Kale, and Singh (2004) report that, over the six-year period 1996–
2001, American firms announced 57,000 alliances.1 Dyer et al. do not
distinguish between equity joint ventures and other forms of alliances, but
even a small proportion of joint ventures among the 57,000 alliances
announced would amount to a large number such ventures.2 Of these,
Bleeke and Ernst (1995) suggest that a majority will be dissolved. Our
purpose in this paper is to understand the process of joint venture for-
mation and dissolution, and to obtain an estimate of joint venture dura-
tion. We consider in particular the role of knowhow acquisition.
The acquisitionofknowhowappears tobe a central aspect of joint ventures.
McConnel and Nantell (1985, Table I) report the findings of a questionnaire
administered by Berg and Friedman (1977) regarding the motives for joint
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ventures. ‘‘To acquire skills and technical knowhow’’ is ranked first among ten
different motives such as ‘‘to acquire distribution facilities’’ (ranked second),
‘‘to acquire capital’’ (ranked seventh), or ‘‘to exploit a product or a licensed
process’’ (ranked tenth). More recently, Doz and Hamel (1998, p. 5) write
that ‘‘alliances may [...] be an avenue for learning and internalizing new skills,
in particular those which are tacit, collective and embedded (and thus hard
to obtain and internalize by other means).’’
We examine the implications of knowhow acquisition for the formation
and duration of joint ventures. Our concern is with the circumstances in
which the desire for knowhow acquisition may lead two f irms to enter
into a joint venture. Following the formation of the venture, we wish to
determine whether there may be a point at which one or both firms may
decide that enough knowhow has been acquired for the joint venture no
longer to be necessary. The decision to dissolve the joint venture clearly is
affected by the contract that regulates exit from the venture. We derive
the properties of an optimal exit contract. We note that, where the desire
to combine knowhow provides the impetus for the joint venture, the
acquisition of knowhow may nonetheless occur and therefore affect the
decision to dissolve the venture.3
The problem we consider is one deemed of great importance by stu-
dents of joint ventures. To take an admittedly extreme example, Reich
andMankin (1986) once argued that ‘‘joint ventures with Japan give away
our future.’’ More recently, Hamel (1991) raised the possibility of ‘‘learn-
ing races’’ between partners in a joint ventures. The partners’ awareness
that knowhow affects bargaining power induces the partners to increase
their knowhow by decreasing the ‘‘transparency’’ of their own knowhow
to their partner and increasing their ‘‘receptivity’’ to their partner’s kno-
whow. Following Hamel, many papers have considered the implications
of learning for what has been called the stability of joint ventures.4
However, as these papers generally have not presented a formal model
of learning in joint ventures, it has been difficult to derive precise testable
implications from the papers. For example, in their analysis of interna-
tional joint ventures between a foreign partner and its local counterpart,
Inkpen and Beamish (1997) assume that learning favors the foreign part-
ner, in the sense that learning should eventually allow that partner to
operate the venture alone. We make no such assumption. Instead, we
derive the identity of the partner who buys out its counterpart at dissolu-
tion from the primitives of our model.
3 The combination of knowhow is not the same as the acquisition of knowhow. The former increases the
knowhow available to the partners in a joint venture, the latter increases the knowhow available to each
partner should the joint venture be dissolved.
4 See for example Arin˜o and de la Torre (1998), Doz (1996), Inkpen and Beamish (1997), Khanna, Gulati,
and Nohria (1998), and Makhija and Ganesh (1997).
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More specifically, we examine a situation in which there are two firms
and one asset. We consider the conditions under which a joint venture—
which involves the joint operation of the asset by the two firms—is
formed. The alternative to the joint venture is the separate operation of
the asset by a single firm. In case a joint venture is formed, we examine the
dynamics of the venture and the increase in each partner’s knowhow
through learning from the other partner. Such learning decreases the
incremental benefit from having the partners join forces. It may then
become profitable for the joint venture to be dissolved and for one
partner to buy out the other and operate the asset alone. On that reading,
and as noted by Reuer (2001), the dissolution of a joint venture is not a
failure attributable to the parent companies’ inability to cooperate, but an
efficient adaptation to a changed situation. It is anticipated at the outset.5
We construct a continuous time model that allows us to characterize
the conditions under which dissolution takes place, to identify the party
that buys out its partner at dissolution, to determine the time to dissolu-
tion, to establish its comparative statics and to examine the implications
of knowledge acquisition for the desirability of joint venture formation.
We find that every joint venture is temporary, in the sense that there
comes a time at which the joint venture is dissolved. Compared with the
separate operation of the asset by a single firm, the joint operation of the
asset in a joint venture brings benefits and entails costs. A crucial benefit is
the opportunity the joint venture offers each partner to acquire the kno-
whow of the other partner. As each partner’s knowhow increases, so does
the partner’s ability to operate the asset separately. The relative benefit of
joint operations over separate operations consequently decreases. It even-
tually disappears altogether. As the costs of joint operations are unaffected,
there comes a time at which the joint venture is dissolved.
There are two costs to joint operations. These costs are associated
with double moral hazard and with the discrepancy in the partners’
costs. Double moral hazard denotes a partner’s concern with the value
of its own stake in the venture rather than the value of the entire
venture. Double moral hazard gives rise to the first cost of joint opera-
tions, for it decreases a partner’s contribution to the venture below
what it would be if the partner were to operate the venture alone, all else
being equal. The second cost of joint operations is that, where there is a
discrepancy in the partners’ costs, there is a cost to having resources
5 A similar point is made by Fluck and Lynch (1999), who consider the succession of a merger and a
divesture. A conglomerate merger creates financial synergies that make possible the financing of a
marginally profitable project that cannot be financed by a stand-alone firm because of agency problems.
Where the project is successful, agency considerations are no longer a concern, and the project is divested
because of coordination costs. For evidence that divesture need not signify failure, see Kaplan and
Weisbach (1992).
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contributed by both partners rather than by the low-cost partner
alone.6
We establish the identity of the superior user of the asset at the time of
optimal dissolution. The profitability of a partner’s use of the asset
depends on the partner’s cost and on the partner’s knowhow. For the
high-cost partner to be the superior user of the asset at dissolution, the
partner’s higher cost must be compensated by that same partner’s higher
knowhow. This is unlikely when the joint venture has been operating for a
long time, for the low-cost partner then has acquired most of the kno-
whow of its high-cost counterpart. It is more likely when the joint venture
is dissolved shortly after having been formed.
In the absence of moral hazard, we show that the superior user at
dissolution is always the low-cost partner. This is because the second
cost of joint operations, which arises from the discrepancy in the partners’
costs, is compounded rather than alleviated by buyout by the high-cost
partner. Following such buyout, all resources would be contributed by
the high-cost partner alone, rather than jointly by the high-cost partner
and the low-cost partner. Consequently, in the absence of moral hazard,
the joint venture will not be dissolved before the low-cost partner has
become the superior user of the asset.
In contrast, when we allow for moral hazard, we find that the superior
user of the asset at dissolution is no longer necessarily the low-cost
partner. It may instead be the high-cost partner. This is because the cost
of moral hazard may be so high as to warrant dissolution at a time when
the low-cost partner has not yet become the superior user of the asset.
Buyout by the high-cost partner compounds the cost of the discrepancy in
costs, but it alleviates the cost of moral hazard.
We find no evidence of learning races between the partners. Why this is
so can perhaps most easily be understood in the case where the low-cost
partner buys out its high-cost counterpart at dissolution. The joint ven-
ture may then be viewed as an arrangement through which the high-cost
partner transmits its knowhow to its low-cost counterpart to capitalize on
the counterpart’s low cost.7 Because the high-cost partner will be bought
out at a price that reflects both the cost advantage of the low-cost partner
and the knowhow it has acquired from the high-cost partner, it is actually
in the interest of the high-cost partner to transmit its knowhow.8 None-
theless, to the extent the partners expect to bargain over the price at which
6 We assume that the cost of operating the asset is unaffected by the acquisition of knowhow.
7 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this view of the joint venture to us.
8 In the case where it is the high-cost partner that buys out its low-cost counterpart, a similar process is at
work, but the partners then wish to capitalize on the high-cost partner’s greater ease of knowhow
acquisition. Although extending the duration of the venture would eventually see the low-cost partner
replace its high-cost counterpart as superior user of the asset, joint operations are costly and are in the
present case optimally dissolved, before the low-cost partner has become the superior user of the asset.
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the low-cost partner is bought out, or over the date at which the joint
venture is dissolved, they may seek to speed up learning to improve their
default positions in negotiation, that is, engage in learning races. Learning
for the purpose of improving bargaining position in negotiation is best
avoided, for it decreases the joint payoff of the partners. We derive an
optimal exit contract that makes the terms of dissolution renegotiation
proof and thereby precludes learning races. This contract is reminiscent of
the ‘‘cake-cutting mechanism,’’ a mechanism whereby one partner speci-
fies a price at which the other partner can either buy out the first partner
or sell out to the first partner.
Our finding of no evidence of learning races is somewhat unexpected,
given the importance attached such races by Hamel (1991) and others. It
is, however, consistent with recent empirical findings by Hennart, Roehl,
and Zietlow (1999), who have questioned whether learning races do in
fact occur. In our model, and as noted above, learning races are precluded
by introducing an exit contract that makes the terms of dissolution
renegotiation proof. The desire to avoid learning races may therefore
account for the importance attached exit clauses in joint venture
contracts.9
Summarizing, we find that (i) joint ventures are necessarily temporary
in nature; (ii) there are no learning races where optimal contracts are
used; (iii) the duration of a joint venture depends on the discrepancy in
the partners’ costs, the extent of moral hazard, the buying partner’s ease
of knowhow acquisition and the amount of knowhow to be acquired; (iv)
dissolution may take place before all knowhow has been acquired; (v) the
identity of the buying partner at dissolution is determined by the extent of
moral hazard and the ease of knowhow acquisition; (vi) the identity of the
buying partner is related to the duration of the venture; (vii) the optimal
exit contract reduces to a modified form of the cake-cutting mechanism
and (viii) dissolution need not imply failure; indeed, dissolution may
mark the success of the venture in achieving the desired transfer of
knowhow.
For example, consider the aircraft engine joint venture between BMW
and Rolls-Royce.10 The venture lasted 10 years and ended in 1999 with the
buyout of BMW by Rolls-Royce. While it is possible that the venture ended
because of a failure to cooperate on the part of the two partners, such an
explanation is unlikely given that BMW was paid in Rolls-Royce shares,
which have made BMW one of the largest shareholders of Rolls-Royce,
9 Besides the cake-cutting mechanism, other exit clauses are put and call options and, in case a third party is
involved, drag-along, tag-along, and pre-emption rights. For a discussion of these and other clauses in
joint venture and venture capital contracts, see Chemla, Habib, and Ljungqvist (2004) and Fluck,
Garrison, and Myers (2005).
10 We note that there is a difference between Rolls-Royce the aircraft engine manufacturer and Rolls-Royce
the car manufacturer. Our concern here is with the former.
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with a 10% stake. Amore likely explanation in our view is that Rolls-Royce,
which long ago had stoppedmanufacturing small aircraft engines, wished to
reenter that business and believed it could prof it from BMW’s small engines
knowhow for that purpose. Once Rolls-Royce had acquired sufficient small
engine knowhow from BMW, there was no longer a need for the joint
venture. BMW was willing to enter into the joint venture and communicate
its small engine knowhow to Rolls-Royce because the joint venture pro-
vided BMW with an additional means through which to profit from such
knowhow. According to our explanation, that Rolls-Royce bought out
BMW rather than the converse was to be expected. Rolls-Royce is an
aircraft engine company, whereas BMW is a car company. The cost to
Rolls-Royce of operating a small aircraft engine business should therefore
be much lower than to BMW.
The available empirical evidence appears to be consistent with our
analysis, at least in so far as the dissolution of joint ventures is concerned.
Kogut (1991) considers 92 joint ventures formed over the 9-year period
1975–1983. He finds that, at the time of his writing, approximately 10
years later than the midpoint of the period 1975–1983, 27 such ventures
were terminated by liquidation and 37 by acquisition. These 64 dissolu-
tions amount to nearly 70% of the joint ventures that were formed. Kogut
(1991) does not, however, distinguish between acquisition by one partner
and acquisition by a third party. Hauswald and Hege (2003) do. They
consider 151 US joint ventures by two publicly traded parents that were
terminated during the period 1985 to 2000. They find that 92 (61%) joint
ventures were terminated by a complete buyout of one partner by the
other, 7 (5%) were acquired by third parties and 52 (34%) were liquidated.
Our article is in the line of a relatively recent but rapidly growing
literature that has applied continuous time methods to corporate finance
problems.11 The main emphasis of this literature has been on explaining
observed leverage ratios and corporate bond spreads.12 More recently,
the literature has been extended to analyze the pricing of venture capital
and of sovereign debt.13 It has also been extended to analyze agency issues
and merger dynamics.14 Our paper continues this process by applying
continuous time techniques to the analysis of the dynamics of joint
ventures. As such, the paper extends the static approach to joint ventures
generally found in the economics literature. This literature has examined
11 For a nice survey of continuous time methods in finance, see Sundaresan (2000).
12 See for example Anderson and Sundaresan (1996), Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001), Fan
and Sundaresan (1999), Hackbarth, Hennessy, and Leland (2004), Leland (1994, 1998), Leland and Toft
(1996), Mella-Barral (1999), and Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997).
13 For the former, see for example Berk, Green, and Naik (2004). For the latter, see Chang and Sundaresan
(2001).
14 For the former, see for example Morellec (2004). For the latter, see Lambrecht (2004), Leland and
Skarabot (2003), and Morellec and Zhdanov (2005).
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the rationale for joint venture formation, and has related the character-
istics of the venture to those of the partners and the environment, but it
has not considered the evolution of the joint venture over time.15
Two exceptions to the static approach found in the economic literature
are Kogut (1989) and Kogut (1991). These two article are primarily
empirical in nature. The first article relates the hazard rate of a venture
to the partners’ ability to maintain the collusive behavior required by the
venture through dealings external to the venture, such as supply and other
contracts. The second article views a joint venture as an option to acquire
and relates the hazard rate of the venture to an improvement in industry
conditions that increases the moneyness of the option, thereby inducing
the optionholder to exercise the option to buy out its counterpart. We do
not consider the former issue and rely instead on the partners’ equity
stakes in the venture to provide them with the requisite incentives. We
explicitly model the learning that is implicit in Kogut’s (1991) empirical
analysis and extend such learning from one-sided learning about industry
prospects to two-sided learning about partners’ knowhow.16
We proceed as follows. We present the model in Section 1. We examine
the case of separate operations in Section 2. We examine the case of joint
operations in the absence of moral hazard in Section 3 and in its presence
in Section 4. In Section 5, we compare the two forms of organization for
the purpose of determining the form chosen at the outset. We compute
the duration of the joint venture in Section 6. We provide a numerical
example in Section 7. We discuss the costs of moral hazard in Section 8.
We provide some empirical evidence and testable implications in Section
9. We conclude in Section 10.
1. The Model
Consider two firms a and b and one asset. Starting at the initial date
t ¼ 0, the asset may be operated separately by a single firm or jointly by
the two firms cooperating in a joint venture. Regardless, the asset may
become worthless because of an exogenous shock at some random date t.
15 For an analysis of joint ventures and strategic alliances, see Allen and Phillips (2000), Belleflamme and
Bloch (2000), Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine (1995), Bruner (1999), Chan et al. (1997), Darrough and
Stoughton (1989), Elfenbein and Lerner (2003), Gomes and Novaes (2001), Hauswald and Hege (2003),
Holmstro¨m (1982), Johnson and Houston (2000), Legros and Matthews (1993), McConnell and Nantell
(1985), Mohanram and Nanda (1998), Noe, Rebello, and Shrikhande (2002), Oxley (1997), Pisano (1989),
Rey and Tirole (1998), Sampson (2004), and Van den Steen (2002).
16 An important exception to the static approach found in the economic literature on joint ventures is
provided by the theoretical literature on research joint ventures [see Muennich (2000) for a survey].
Research joint ventures are inherently dynamic, in that they are formed for the specific purpose of
conducting some joint research and are dissolved upon completion of that research. The literature on
research joint ventures has taken the dissolution time as given. It therefore does not address the issues of
whether a joint venture will be dissolved and, if so, when. Our analysis addresses these issues.
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If this happens, the asset is best liquidated. The separate operation of the
asset by firm i, i 2 fa; bg, yields instantaneous revenue at date t 2 ½0;t 
Rðei,kiðtÞÞ ¼ ei kiðtÞ1, ð1Þ
at instantaneous cost
CiðeiÞ ¼ !iei, ð2Þ
where ei 2 Rþ denotes the resources contributed to the asset by firm i at
the start of separate operations, kiðtÞ 2 Rþ* denotes firm i’s knowhow at
date t,  2 ð0,1Þ indexes the importance of the resources contributed
relative to that of knowhow and !i 2 Rþ* denotes the cost of a unit of
resources contributed by firm i. For example, the asset may be a plant or
a research laboratory, the resources contributed may be engineers or
scientists,  indexes the importance of the engineers or the scientists’
role relative to that of the knowhow embedded in the firm’s processes
and procedures, and !i represents the opportunity cost to the firm of
contributing the engineers and the scientists to the plant or the research
laboratory.
The liquidation date t is modeled as a stopping time with constant
intensity  2 Rþ*. This essentially means that, at any date t < t, the
probability of liquidation before tþ is approximately . This simple
modeling of liquidation assumes that the stopping time has stochastic
arrival intensity.17 The stopping time may be the time at which a new
technology appears, that renders worthless the asset, the resources, and
the knowhow. It is then best immediately to stop operations and liquidate
the venture.
We now consider the joint operation of the asset by the two firms, now
partners in a joint venture. The joint operation of the asset yields instan-
taneous revenue at date t  0
RJðeÞ ¼ sðeÞk1, ð3Þ
where
sðeÞ ¼ aa bb
 1
eaa e
b
b : ð4Þ
The vector e  ðea,ebÞ denotes the resources contributed by the two
partners at the start of joint operations, the constant i 2 ð0,1Þ indexes
17 Artzner and Delbaen (1989), Lando (1994), and Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) introduced this modeling
device to the pricing of defaultable bonds.
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the relative importance of partner i’s contribution, a þ b ¼ 1, and the
constant k 2 Rþ* denotes the two firms’ combined knowhow, with
k  kað0Þ þ kbð0Þ. The strict inequality k < kað0Þ þ kbð0Þ corresponds
to the case where there is some overlap between the initial knowhows
of the two firms. By analogy to the vector e, we let the vector
kðtÞ  ðkaðtÞ,kbðtÞÞ denote the partners’ knowhow at date t. To continue
with the example above, a and b index the relative importance of the
engineers or scientists contributed to the venture by partners a and b,
respectively.
We note that the combination of knowhow in the joint venture (k vs.
kiðtÞ) can be viewed as making possible increased revenues (e.g., from
cross-selling), decreased costs (e.g. from the adoption of more efficient
production techniques), or both.18
The factor aa 
b
b
 1
in (4) ensures that combining knowhow only
increases revenues when the two partners do not have the same kno-
whow. When k ¼ kað0Þ ¼ kbð0Þ, revenues are equal in the case where a
single firm operating the asset alone contributes resources e and in that
where each of two partners jointly operating the asset contributes
resources ei ¼ ie.19 Figure 1 plots RJðeÞ as a function of partner i’s
relative contribution.
Figure 1
Revenues from Joint Operations RJ (e)
18 More formally, introducing the notation, riðtÞ, ciðtÞ, r, and c, such that kiðtÞ ¼ riðtÞ  ciðtÞ and k ¼ r c,
the overall impact of combining knowhow consists of an impact on gross revenues (r vs. riðtÞ) and an
impact on costs (c vs. ciðtÞ). The revenues Rð:Þ and RJ ð:Þ should therefore be viewed as net revenues, or
EBIT.
19 The contribution of resources in the proportions a and b is optimal in the sense of maximizing revenues
for a given level of total resource contributions. In other words, for a given e ¼ ea þ eb, RJ ðeÞ is
maximized when ea=e ¼ a and eb=e ¼ b.
The Role of Knowhow Acquisition
197
The cost to firm i of contributing resources ei is unaffected by how the
asset is operated: it is CiðeiÞ in either case.
We assume joint operation in a joint venture to be the only channel
through which knowhow can be acquired and that each partner acquires
the other partner’s knowhow. Thus, the two partners’ combined kno-
whow, k, remains constant throughout, and each firm’s knowhow kiðtÞ
remains constant under separate operations. Figure 2 shows the relation
between the initial knowhow of a partner, the knowhow the partner can
potentially acquire in the joint venture, and the partners’ combined
knowhow.
A firm’s knowhow at any point in time is therefore the sum of its initial
knowhow and the knowhow it gained while in a joint venture20
kiðtÞ ¼ kið0Þ þ giðtÞ: ð5Þ
The conditions we impose on the gain function, giðtÞ, are intended to
reflect the following:
Figure 2
Firms’ initial knowhow, ðkað0Þ, kbð0ÞÞ, Combined Knowhow, k, and Knowhow to be Acquired
20 This is a form of learning-by-doing. For an application of learning-by-doing to the related field of venture
capital, see Bergemann and Hege (2005).
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(i) A partner’s knowhow never decreases; hence, the gain in
knowhow is an increasing function of time. That is,
dgiðtÞ=dt  0.
(ii) A partner’s knowhow does not jump through time; hence, the
gain in knowhow is a continuous function of time.
(iii) A partner’s knowhow initially equals kið0Þ; hence, the gain in
knowhow initially equals zero. That is, gið0Þ ¼ 0.
(iv) A partner’s knowhow is at most equal to the two partners’
combined knowhow, k; hence, the knowhow gained by a partner
is at most equal to the difference between the partners’ combined
knowhow and that same partner’s initial knowhow. That is,
limt!þ1 giðtÞ ¼ k  kið0Þ.
(v) The acquisition of knowhow is uncertain; hence, the gain in
knowhow is an increasing function of a stochastic state variable,
xðtÞ, that reflects how favorable are learning conditions within
the joint venture.
(vi) A partner’s gain in knowhow depends on the ease with which
that partner acquires its counterpart’s knowhow; hence, the gain
in knowhow is an increasing function of a parameter, fi 2 R, that
indexes the ease with which knowhow may be acquired.
(vii) A partner’s knowhow is constant under separate operations;
hence, the gain in knowhow is constant under separate opera-
tions. That is, dgiðtÞ=dt ¼ 0 under separate operations.
A simple functional form that reflects the preceding conditions is21
giðtÞ ¼ k  kið0Þ
  xðtÞ  1
xðtÞ  fi
 
: ð6Þ
Condition (v) requires that fi < 1.
22 Condition (iii) requires that
xð0Þ ¼ 1. To satisfy conditions (i), (ii), (iv), and (vii), we take the learning
conditions state variable, xðtÞ, to be the historical maximum of an
upward drifting geometric Brownian motion, yðtÞ, over the interval of
time, TJðtÞ, during which the joint venture has been in operation at date t
xðtÞ  max
2T J ðtÞ
yðÞf g, ð7Þ
where
21 In addition, the functional form (6) delivers closed form solutions and finite resource contributions.
22 Knowhow is acquired most easily as fi ! 1. It is acquired least easily as fi ! 1.
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dyðtÞ ¼ yðtÞdtþ yðtÞdBðtÞ, ð8Þ
yð0Þ ¼ 1, ð,Þ 2 Rþ*  Rþ*, and BðtÞ denotes a standard Brownian
motion. We further assume that yðtÞ is constant under separate operations.23
Figures 3 and 4 show how (7) affects the gain in knowhow and the
knowhow itself by (6) and (5), respectively. Firms gain knowhow but do
not lose it. They do not gain knowhow over some periods of time. Figure 5
shows firm i’s knowhow as a function of the ease of knowhow acquisition,
fi, and firm i’s initial knowhow, kið0Þ.
As a firm acquires knowhow through the joint operation of the asset,
the firm increases the profitability of its separate operation of the asset.
A phase of joint operations therefore makes separate operations more
desirable than was the case at the start of joint operations. Should the
joint venture eventually be dissolved, the separate operation of the asset
by firm i yields instantaneous revenue Rðe^i,ki ð^tÞÞ at instantaneous cost
Ciðe^iÞ at date t  t^. Here, e^i 2 Rþ denotes the resources contributed by
firm i at the date t^ at which the joint venture is dissolved and separate
operations are initiated.
In the case where separate operations entail the sale of the asset from its
original owner to its best user, firms a and b can be expected to bargain
over the sale price of the asset. In the case of joint operations, the original
owner of the asset naturally expects to be compensated for bringing the
asset into the joint venture. Besides the asset itself, the partners make
contributions that differ in their relative importance to the venture. The
partners can therefore be expected to bargain over a transfer payment
Figure 3
Learning Uncertainty Factor, xðtÞ
23 This ensures that, in accordance with condition (ii), there is no jump in knowhow in case joint operations
should start at date t > 0.
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intended to establish a balance between the partners’ contributions to the
venture and their share of the gains from the venture. We assume costless
bargaining between the parties. We adopt the generalized Nash bargaining
solution, and denote i, 0  i  1, the bargaining power of firm
i, a þ b ¼ 1.24 We assume all payments aremade in cash and are verifiable.
In case joint operations should at some point be abandoned for sepa-
rate operations, the superior user of the asset should buy out its ‘inferior’
counterpart. In the absence of an exit contract, the payment made by the
Figure 4
Evolution of Firm i ’s Knowhow, kiðtÞ
Figure 5
Evolution of Firm i ’s Knowhow, kiðtÞ
24 For a discussion of the Nash bargaining solution, see, for example, Myerson (1997).
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former to the latter, and possibly the time at which to dissolve the
venture, would be left to negotiation. Such negotiation is best avoided.
The bargaining that accompanies negotiation between the partners over
and at the time the joint venture is dissolved can be expected to distort the
partners’ choices (e.g., Hart, 1995). We therefore solve for an exit contract
that achieves a renegotiation-proof equilibrium. Thus, although our
model allows for negotiation over both the time of dissolution and the
price to be paid at such time, the exit contract we derive is such as to deny
the partners the incentives to engage in such negotiation.25
Throughout, we assume that there are no asymmetries of information, that
capital markets are frictionless, that agents are risk neutral, and that theymay
borrow and lend freely at the constant, risk-free rate of interest, r0 2 Rþ*.
In the sections that follow, we shall analyze the determinants of the
formation and duration of joint ventures. We first examine the value of
the asset under separate and joint operations. We then compare these
values for the purpose of determining the form of organization chosen at
the outset.
2. Separate Operations
We first consider the value of separate operations, assuming they are the
organizational form chosen at date t ¼ 0. Given that knowhow is con-
stant under separate operations, kiðtÞ ¼ kið0Þ for all t  0, the value to
firm i of operating the asset separately at date t  0 is
Vi,Sðkið0ÞÞ  max
ei
Et
Z þ1
t
expr0ðtÞ Rðei,kið0ÞÞ  CiðeiÞ½ 1f<tgd
  	
: ð9Þ
The factor 1ft<tg is a random variable that is 1 for all dates before the
event of liquidation and 0 afterwards. We now establish26
Proposition 1. The value to firm i of operating the asset separately at any
date t  0 is
Vi,Sðkið0ÞÞ ¼ kið0Þ
r
ð1 Þ 
!i

  
1
, ð10Þ
25 Our model also allows the partners to renegotiate their shares of the continuing joint venture. However,
as we shall see in Section 4.2, the stationary nature of the problem implies that the partners have no
incentive to engage in such renegotiation.
26 All proofs are in the Appendix.
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where
r  r0 þ : ð11Þ
The resources contributed by firm i at the start of separate operations are
ei,S ¼ kið0Þð=!iÞ1=1.
Let Sið0Þ  Vi,Sðkið0ÞÞ=Vj,Sðkjð0ÞÞ denote the value at date 0 of firm i’s
separate operations relative to firm j’s ði 6¼ jÞ. Using (10), we have
Sið0Þ ¼ kið0Þ
!

1
i
!

1
j
kjð0Þ : ð12Þ
Without loss of generality, we assume that Sað0Þ  1 and refer to firm a
as the superior user of the asset at date t ¼ 0. The constancy of knowhow
under separate operations then implies that the asset should be owned by
firm a. Under separate operations, the optimal allocation of ownership is
constant through time and depends only on the exogenous characteristics
of the firms, ðkað0Þ,!aÞ and ðkbð0Þ,!bÞ.
Furthermore, to the extent that the original owner of the asset at date t ¼ 0
differs from the superior user of the asset at that date, the asset will immedi-
ately be traded. Thus, in case firm b should own the asset at date t ¼ 0, it
should sell the asset to firm a, for the latter firm is the superior user of the asset.
As noted in Section 1, we adopt the generalizedNash bargaining solution to
determine the sale price of the asset, pS. The Nash bargaining solution sets a
price that distributes the gains from exchanging the asset in proportion to the
partners’ bargaining power. The payoffs in case of disagreement determine
the upper and lower bound on that price. We solve for the Nash bargaining
solution as follows:27 in the absence of an agreement to exchange the asset,
the payoff to firm a is zero, that to firm b is Vb,Sðkbð0ÞÞ. The gain to buying
the asset is Va,Sðkað0ÞÞ  pS for firm a. The gain to selling the asset is
pS  Vb,Sðkbð0ÞÞ for firm b. The Nash bargaining solution is characterized as
max
Vb,Sðkbð0ÞÞpSVa,Sðkað0ÞÞ
Va,Sðkað0ÞÞ  pS½ a pS  Vb,Sðkbð0ÞÞ½ b : ð13Þ
It equals
pS ¼ bVa,Sðkað0ÞÞ þ aVb,Sðkbð0ÞÞ: ð14Þ
27 Our exposition of the solution follows Fan and Sundaresan (2000).
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The value of separate operations to firm i, i 2 fa; bg, at date t ¼ 0,
including the value of the option to trade the asset, is then
Ua,Sðkð0Þ j OÞ  Va,Sðkað0ÞÞ if O ¼ b,pS þ Va,Sðkað0ÞÞ if O ¼ b,

ð15Þ
Ub,Sðkð0Þ j OÞ  0 if O ¼ a,pS if O ¼ b:

ð16Þ
whereO 2 fa; bg denotes the original owner of the asset. As the two firms
internalize the option to trade the asset, the aggregate value of separate
operations to the two firms at date t ¼ 0, including the option value of
trading the asset, equals the value of separate operations to firm a, the
superior user of the asset at date t ¼ 0
WSðkð0ÞÞ  Ua,Sðkð0Þ j OÞ þUb,Sðkð0Þ j OÞ ¼ Va,Sðkað0ÞÞ: ð17Þ
3. Joint Operations without Moral Hazard
We now consider the value of the joint venture, assuming it is the
form of organization chosen at date t ¼ 0. We proceed by backward
induction. We initially determine the value of the joint venture at
dissolution, should such dissolution occur. We then determine the
value of the joint venture before dissolution. For purposes of compar-
ison, we first ignore any moral hazard consideration.
3.1 The value of a dissolved joint venture
Should the partners forego joint operations and the joint venture be
dissolved, separate operations would nonetheless remain possible.28 If
firm i were to operate the asset separately after the joint venture is
dissolved at a date t^, firm i would have value at a date t  t^
Vi,Sðki ð^tÞÞ max
e^i
Et
Z þ1
t
expr0ðtÞ Rðe^i,ki ð^tÞÞCiðe^iÞ½ 1f<tgd
  	
: ð18Þ
Knowhow remains constant once the joint venture has been dissolved:
kiðtÞ ¼ ki ð^tÞ for all t  t^. By analogy to the results of Proposition 1, we
28 Note that a dissolution of the joint venture is necessarily permanent. This is because both knowhow and
learning conditions remain unchanged during the phase of separate operations that follows dissolution.
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have e^i ¼ ki ð^tÞð=!iÞ1=1 and
Vi,Sðki ð^tÞÞ ¼ ki ð^tÞ
r
ð1 Þ 
!i

  
1
: ð19Þ
Let H 2 fa; bg refer to the partner that is the superior user of the asset
at the date of dissolution, t^. Let L 2 fa; bg refer to the other partner.
That is, SH ð^tÞ  1 and SLð^tÞ  1, where Si ð^tÞ is defined analogously to
Sið0Þ in (12), with kið0Þ and kjð0Þ replaced by ki ð^tÞ and kj ð^tÞ, respectively.
Importantly, note that H is not necessarily the superior user of the asset
at date t ¼ 0, which we have assumed to be a. That is, the assumption
Sað0Þ  1 does not imply Sað^tÞ  1.
3.2 The first-best value of joint operations
We begin with the assumption that each partner maximizes the value of
the entire venture, rather than the value of the partner’s own stake. The
first-best value of joint operations at date t 2 ½0; t^ is
W JðxðtÞÞ max
ejt¼0,^t
Et
Z t^
t
expr0ðtÞ RJðeÞ CaðeaÞ CbðebÞ½ 1ð<tÞd
" #(
þEt
h
expr0 ð^ttÞVH,SðkH ð^tÞÞ1ð^t<tÞ
io
: ð20Þ
The partners make the jointly optimal contributions to the venture
ei  argmaxei ½W Jð1Þ. They choose the jointly optimal dissolution
time t^  argmaxt^½W Jðxð^tÞÞ. As the gain in knowhow, giðtÞ in (6), is
an increasing function of the state variable xðtÞ, the problem is weakly
path dependent in the historical maximum of the geometric Brownian
motion yðtÞ over the period of joint operations.29 The optimization
problem regarding the choice of dissolution time is then time homo-
geneous. Hence, t^ is the first time xðtÞ reaches some upper time-
independent threshold level. That is, there exists a constant x^J such
that t^ ¼ infft j xðtÞ ¼ x^Jg. Optimal dissolution then requires that
partner H operates the asset separately. We now show:
Proposition 2. The first-best value of joint operations to partner i, at a date
t 2 ½0; t^, is
29 Equilibrium strategies are therefore Markov, open loop (i.e., state dependent) and perfect state (i.e., with
perfect information).
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W JðxðtÞÞ ¼ 1 ð Þ
r
sðeÞk1 1 xðtÞ
x^J

 	" #
þVH,SðkH ð^tÞÞ xðtÞ
x^J

 	
,
ð21Þ
where
sðeÞ ¼ k 
!aa !
b
b
 ! 1
1
, ð22Þ
	  2½2=2 þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ð 2=2Þ2 þ 2r2
q
, ð23Þ
and r is given in (11). The resources contributed by partner i are
ei ¼ i
!i
sðeÞk1: ð24Þ
The knowhow attained by partner i when dissolution occurs is
ki ð^tÞ ¼ k 1 2	
1þ 	
Bð1Þ
AHð1Þ
Gið1Þ
GHð1Þ

 
, ð25Þ
where
AiðXÞ  1þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1þ 2fið1þ 	Þ2GiðXÞ
s" #
, ð26Þ
BðXÞ  1 !
L
HX
!LL
" # 
1
, ð27Þ
and
GiðXÞ  1 fið Þ
k  kið0Þ
2	kBðXÞ : ð28Þ
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Dissolution takes place the first time x(t) reaches
x^J ¼ ð1þ 	ÞAHð1ÞGHð1Þ þ fH : ð29Þ
The superior user of the asset at dissolution, H, is always the low cost
partner, that is H is such that !H ¼ minf!a;!bg.
The term 	 in (23) is the positive root of the characteristic equation
	22=2þ 	ð 2=2Þ  r ¼ 0 and 	 > 1. It is the elasticity of the prob-
ability of dissolution with respect to learning conditions, xðtÞ. The term
ðxðtÞ=x^JÞ	 in (21) is the probability-weighted discount factor for the gains
from dissolution at date t^.
Equation (21) reflects the option value to dissolution. For t < t^, the
value of the venture equals the sum of capitalized profits under joint
operations and the value of the asset under separate operations, adjusted
for the exercise of the option to dissolve that exchanges the former for the
latter. At t ¼ t^, joint operations are abandoned for separate operations
by the superior user of the asset. As x^J is reached with certainty, the joint
venture is dissolved with certainty.
To understand this result, recall that the acquisition of knowhow
increases the partners’ ability to operate the asset separately. It conse-
quently decreases the benefits that combining and acquiring knowhow
confer to joint operations relative to separate operations. Eventually,
such benefits are no longer sufficient to offset the costs associated with
the discrepancy in costs.30 Joint operations are then abandoned for
separate operations.
The discrepancy in costs ð!a 6¼ !bÞ decreases the low-cost partner’s
contribution.31 It implies that the buying partner at the time of dissolu-
tion necessarily will be the low-cost partner, for the cost of the discre-
pancy would otherwise be compounded rather than alleviated.
Consequently, in the absence of moral hazard, the joint venture will not
be dissolved before the low-cost partner has become the superior user of
the asset. An extended period of joint operations allows each partner to
acquire most of its counterpart’s knowhow. Each partner’s knowhow
then approaches the combined knowhow, k. In the absence of a large
difference in the partners’ knowhow, the profitability of the separate
operation of the asset following dissolution depends on the user’s cost.
This makes the low-cost partner the superior user of the asset.
30 Note that there is no cost of moral hazard in the present case. This can be seen by comparing ea þ eb
from (24) with e^i ¼ ki ð^tÞð=!iÞ1=1 from Section 3.1. Absent differences in knowhow and in costs, the
resource contributed are the same.
31 This can be seen from (24) and (22), which show the low-cost partner’s contribution to be decreased by
the high-cost partner’s high cost.
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4. Joint Operations with Moral Hazard
We now consider the case where each partner pursues its own interest and
maximizes the value of its own stake in the venture. We specify a contract
that regulates the relations between the partners in Section 4.1. We derive
an optimal contract and the corresponding value of joint operations in the
presence of moral hazard in Section 4.2. We discuss how to implement the
optimal contract in Section 4.3. In Section 4.4, we compute the contract
payments made at the formation of the joint venture.
4.1 The contract between the partners
We assume that joint revenue, RJðeÞ, is observable and verifiable, but
that the resources contributed to the venture, e, are neither observable
nor verifiable. Returning to the example of Section 1, it may be difficult to
contract upon the skills and competencies of the engineers or scientists
delegated to the venture and even precisely to ascertain such skills. We
further assume that the state variable, xðtÞ, is observable but not verifi-
able. The partners in the joint venture are therefore limited to writing a
contract that conditions each partner’s payoff on the venture’s revenues.
We consider an equity-like contract.32 The contract promises each part-
ner a constant share 
i, 0 < 
i < 1, of the joint revenues RJðeÞ, with

a þ 
b ¼ 1.33
The contract also specifies the rules that govern exit from the venture.
Recall from Section 1 that we seek a renegotiation proof equilibrium, to
avoid the distortion to the partners’ choices caused by the expectation of
renegotiation. A necessary condition for the contract to be renegotiation
proof is that it allocates the asset to the superior user at dissolution, H.
We therefore consider exit rules whose payoffs to the partners are affine
functions of the value of the asset in the hands of the superior user at
dissolution, H. That is, denoting V*i ðkH ð^tÞÞ the payoff to partner i at
dissolution,
V *i ðkH ð^tÞÞ ¼  0i þ  Hi VH,SðkH ð^tÞÞ, ð30Þ
where ð 0i , Hi Þ 2 R2 are such that  0a þ  0b ¼ 0 and  Ha þ  Hb ¼ 1.
4.2 The optimal contract and the second-best value
Renegotiation proofness requires that the partners’ optimal dissolution
times coincide, i.e., t^a ¼ t^b, where t^i denotes partner’s i’s optimal
32 The optimal contract we derive is therefore optimal only among equity-like contracts. We do not consider
debt- or convertible-like contracts because these rarely are used in joint ventures.
33 The inequalities are strict as each partner must be induced to make some non-zero contribution to the
venture.
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dissolution time.34 The exit contract we derive in the present section is
intended to achieve such coincidence. To the partners, the expectation of
renegotiation proofness implies that the actual dissolution time, t^, is the
earlier of the two partners’ privately optimal dissolution times, t^a and t^b.
That is, t^  minf^ta; t^bg. The equilibrium we seek is therefore a Nash
Equilibrium in which i) the partners expect no renegotiation, ii) each
partner chooses its privately optimal dissolution time, iii) the exit con-
tract ensures that the partners’ optimal dissolution times are identical,
and iv) neither partner wishes to renegotiate.
We denote by Vi,JðxðtÞÞ the value to partner i of operating the asset
jointly with partner j, at a date t  0. Each partner i maximizes Vi,JðxðtÞÞ
over the partner’s resource contribution to the venture and the time at
which to dissolve the venture. The partners’ optimization problems are
therefore
Va,JðxðtÞÞ ¼ maxeajt¼0,^ta Et
R t^
t
expr0ðtÞ 
aRJðeÞ  CaðeaÞ½ 1ð<tÞd
h in
þEt
h
expr0 ð^ttÞV *a ðkH ð^tÞÞ1ð^t<tÞ
io
, ð31Þ
Vb,JðxðtÞÞ ¼ maxebjt¼0,^tb Et
R t^
t
expr0ðtÞ 
bRJðeÞ  CbðebÞ½ 1ð<tÞd
h in
þEt
h
expr0 ð^ttÞV *b ðkH ð^tÞÞ1ð^t<tÞ
io
:
8>>>>><
>>>>:
Both parties take into account that the actual dissolution time, t^, is the
earlier of the two partners’ privately optimal dissolution times, t^a and t^b.
Here again, each partner’s optimization problem regarding the choice of
dissolution time is time homogeneous. Hence, each partner’s privately
optimal time of dissolution, t^i, is the first time xðtÞ reaches some upper
time-independent threshold level. That is, there exists a constant x^i such
that t^i ¼ infft j xðtÞ ¼ x^ig. We denote the aggregate value of joint opera-
tions to the two partners
WJðxðtÞÞ  Va,JðxðtÞÞ þ Vb,JðxðtÞÞ: ð32Þ
We derive the value of the joint venture for each partner and charac-
terize each partner’s optimal dissolution time and resource contribution.
We then derive the optimal renegotiation proof contract. We present our
results in two propositions, Proposition 3 and Proposition 4.
34 The equality of the privately optimal dissolution times makes such time jointly optimal as well. There is
therefore no possibility of increasing the parties’ joint payoff by changing the time of dissolution.
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Proposition 3. A family of renegotiation-proof contracts that maximizes
the value of the joint venture consists of (i) a sharing rule

i ¼ ð
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1þNi
p
 1Þ=Ni, ð33Þ
if a 6¼ b, and 
i ¼ 1=2 if a ¼ b, where
Ni  ð1 2iÞ
ið1  þ iÞ , ð34Þ
and (ii) an exit rule, ð 0i , Hi Þ, satisfying
 0i ¼Mi
k
r


a
!a

 a 
b
!b

 b" # 1
, ð35Þ
where
Mi   Hi ð1 
iÞð2i  1Þ þ ð
i   Hi Þð1 iÞ: ð36Þ
In case the joint venture is dissolved, dissolution takes the form of the
buyout of partner L by partner H.
The intuition for the results is as follows. Recall that i indexes the
relative importance of partner i’s contribution to the venture. When
i > 1=2, partner i’s contribution is more important, and 
i > 1=2,
reflecting the greater need to elicit that partner’s contribution.35 Further-
more, when i > 1=2,  
0
i < 0 when  
H
i ¼ 
i. Partner j, whose contribu-
tion is less important, should be more reluctant to dissolve the venture
because joint operations allow that partner to profit from partner i’s
more important contribution. To be induced to choose dissolution at the
same time as partner i, thereby ensuring renegotiation proofness, partner
j must be offered the payment  0j ¼  0i > 0 at dissolution. Alterna-
tively, renegotiation proofness can be achieved by setting  0j ¼ 0 and
 Hj > 
j, thereby compensating partner j by offering it a larger share of
the value of the asset at dissolution than was its share of profits during
joint operations.
Proposition 4. The value of joint operations to partner i, at a date t 2 ½0; t^, is
35 It is simple to show that @
i=@i > 0. Note that 
a and 
b are made renegotiation proof over the period
of joint operations by their constancy over time.
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Vi,JðxðtÞÞ ¼
i 1 ið Þ
r
sðeÞk1 1 xðtÞ
x^J

 	" #
þ V *i ðkH ð^tÞÞ
xðtÞ
x^J

 	
, ð37Þ
where r and 	 are given in (11) and (23), respectively, and where
sðeÞ ¼ k  
a
!a

 a 
b
!b

 b" # 11
: ð38Þ
The resources contributed by partner i are
ei ¼ 
ii
!i
sðeÞk1: ð39Þ
The knowhow attained by partner i when dissolution occurs is
ki ð^tÞ ¼ k 1 2	
1þ 	
BðÞ
AHðÞ
GiðÞ
GHðÞ

 
, ð40Þ
where AiðXÞ, BðX Þ, and GiðXÞ are given in (26), (27), and (28), respec-
tively, and
  
aa 
bb
1 ð
aa þ 
bbÞ
1 
 1

: ð41Þ
Dissolution takes place the first time x(t) reaches
x^J ¼ ð1þ 	ÞAHðÞGHðÞ þ fH : ð42Þ
The superior user of the asset at dissolution, H, is partner a, if
Sað^tÞjH¼a  1, where
Sað^tÞjH¼a 
kað^tÞjH¼a
!

1
a
!

1
b
kbð^tÞjH¼a
ð43Þ
is obtained using (40). Otherwise, the superior user, H, is partner b.
A comparison of (24) with (39) shows that moral hazard lowers the
partners’ resource contributions.
The Role of Knowhow Acquisition
211
Two results stand out. First, it is now possible for the high-cost partner
to be the superior user of the asset at dissolution. Second, there are no
learning races. We discuss these results in turn.
. The high-cost partner can be the superior user of the asset at dissolu-
tion:
Recall from the discussion that follows Proposition 2 that, in the
absence of moral hazard, the joint venture will not be dissolved before
the low-cost partner has become the superior user of the asset. When moral
hazard is introduced, its cost may be so high as to warrant dissolution
before such time. In such case, the high-cost partner will be the superior
user of the asset, its high cost compensated by its still higher knowhow.
Although buyout by the high-cost partner compounds the problem of the
discrepancy in costs, it alleviates the problem of moral hazard.
Note that the presence of moral hazard is necessary but not sufficient
for the high-cost partner to be the superior user of the asset at dissolution.
Either partner can be the superior user at dissolution in the presence of
moral hazard. For the high-cost partner to be the superior user, that
partner’s higher cost must be compensated by that same partner’s higher
knowhow. This is unlikely to be the case when the joint venture has been
operating for a long time, for the low-cost partner then has acquired most
of the knowhow of its high-cost counterpart. It is more likely to be the
case when the joint venture is relatively short-lived, and the high-cost
partner has greater ease of knowhow acquisition.36
. There are no learning races:
A learning race requires that a partner’s payoff be increasing in that
same partner’s knowhow and decreasing in its counterpart’s knowhow.
Instead, (37) shows that both the partners’ payoffs are increasing in the
buying partner’s knowhow at dissolution, kH ð^tÞ, and that neither part-
ner’s payoff depends on the the selling partner’s knowhow at dissolution,
kLð^tÞ.37 As noted in the Introduction, this result crucially depends on the
presence of an exit contract that makes the terms of dissolution renego-
tiation proof, thereby denying the partners the incentive to acquire kno-
whow for the purpose of affecting negotiation.
4.3 Implementing the second-best contract
We now show how to implement the second-best contract derived in
Proposition 3, particularly the optimal exit rule.
36 The greater the high-cost partner’s ease of knowhow acquisition, fi , the higher that same partner’s
knowhow. Formally, partner i’s knowhow at dissolution can be seen from (26) and (28) to increase in fi .
37 Interestingly, if it were possible for the partners to strategically manipulate the ease of knowhow
acquisition, fi , both partners would wish to increase fH , and neither partner would be concerned with fL.
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A mechanism commonly used in joint venture agreements is the ‘‘Cake-
Cutting Mechanism’’ (CCM).38 The heart of the mechanism is as follows:
The ‘‘Cake-Cutting Mechanism’’: At dissolution, partner j 2 fa; bg,
chooses an exit price for the asset, WCCM . Partner i 2 fa; bg, with i 6¼ j,
either buys out partner j for 
jW
CCM or sells out to partner j for 
iW
CCM .
We show in the Appendix that the CCM amounts to an exit rule that has
partner H buy out partner L at dissolution and sets
 0i , 
H
i
 
,  0j , 
H
j
 
¼
0,
ið Þ, 0,
j
 
ifði, jÞ ¼ ðH,LÞ,
0,
i
Vi,Sðki ð^tÞÞ
Vj,Sðkj ð^tÞÞ
 
, ð0,1 
i Vi,Sðki ð^tÞÞVj,Sðkj ð^tÞÞ

8<
:
ifði, jÞ ¼ ðH,LÞ:
ð44Þ
The CCM effectively gives all bargaining power to partner j, as it
grants that partner the privilege to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer when
setting the exit price.39
The discussion in the Appendix and (44) show that the CCM corre-
sponds to the optimal exit rule ½ð 0i ,
iÞ, ð 0j ,
jÞ only if j ¼ L and if
supplemented by the payments  0i and  
0
j . We have seen that Proposition
4 identifies the partner H 2 fa; bg who should buy out its counterpart to
operate the asset alone. It consequently identifies the partner L who should
set the exit price at dissolution for the optimal exit rule to be implemented.
Corollary 1. A renegotiation-proof contract that maximizes the value of the
joint venture consists of (i) a sharing rule 
i given in (33) and (ii) a CCM
exit rule where the choice of the exit price is the prerogative of the inferior
user of the asset at dissolution, partner L, combined with a payment
 0i ¼ 
ið1 
iÞð2i  1Þ
k
r


a
!a

 a 
b
!b

 b" # 1
: ð45Þ
Partner L is identifiable as the partner for which SLð^tÞ < 1, where SLð^tÞ
is obtained using the expressions for the partners’ knowhow in (40).
38 The CCM is also known as the ‘‘Russian Roulette’’ clause, the ‘‘Texas Shootout’’ clause, the ‘‘Dynamite’’
clause, or the ‘‘Shotgun’’ clause. See Crawford and Heller (1979) for a formal analysis of the CCM under
symmetric information and Cramton, Gibbons, and Klemperer (1987), McAfee (1992), and Minehart
and Neeman (1999) for an analysis of how to dissolve a partnership under asymmetric information. The
latter two articles consider the role of the CCM in such circumstances.
39 Note that the CCM provides the partner presented with the exit price, partner i, with the ability to ‘‘turn
the table’’ on the partner that sets the exit price, partner j. This ensures that partner j neither inflates the
price if wishing to sell nor deflates it if wishing to buy.
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4.4 Initial transfers
Although there is no sale of the asset at date t ¼ 0 in the case of joint
operations, the initial owner of the asset must be compensated for con-
tributing the asset to the joint venture. The same is true for the firm that is
expected to make the contribution of greater relative importance to the
venture. As noted in Section 1, we adopt the generalized Nash bargaining
solution to determine the payment made by one partner to the other at date
t ¼ 0. Cash is paid in exchange for a stake in a joint venture with a partner
that may be bringing the asset into the venture or may be making a
contribution of greater relative importance to the venture. We denote pJ
the (possibly negative) payment from firm a to firm b. We recall that
O 2 fa; bg denotes the original owner of the asset. We define
Vi,Sðkið0Þ j OÞ  Vi,Sðkið0ÞÞ if O ¼ i and Vi,Sðkið0Þ j OÞ  0 if O 6¼ i. In
the absence of an agreement to form the venture, the payoff to firm a is
Va,Sðkað0Þ j OÞ, that to firm b is Vb,Sðkbð0Þ j OÞ.40 The incremental value
for firm a of becoming a partner in the joint venture is
Va,Jð1Þ  pJ  Va,Sðkað0Þ j OÞ. The incremental value for firm b of becom-
ing a partner in the joint venture is Vb,Jð1Þ þ pJ  Vb,Sðkbð0Þ j OÞ. By
analogy to the analysis in Section 2, the Nash solution can be shown to be
pJ ¼ b Va,Jð1Þ  Va,Sðkað0Þ j OÞ½  þ a Vb,Sðkbð0Þ j OÞ  Vb,Jð1Þ½ : ð46Þ
Given that WJð1Þ ¼ Va,Jð1Þ þ Vb,Jð1Þ, the value of joint operations to
firm i, i 2 fa; bg, at date t ¼ 0, including the payment from firm a to firm
b, is then
Ua,Jðkð0Þ j OÞ  aWJð1Þ þ ð1 aÞVa,Sðkað0ÞÞ if O=a,aWJð1Þ  aVb,Sðkbð0ÞÞ if O=b,

ð47Þ
Ub,Jðkð0Þ j OÞ  bWJð1Þ  bVa,Sðkað0ÞÞ if O=a,bWJð1Þ þ ð1 bÞVb,Sðkbð0ÞÞ if O=b.

ð48Þ
We clearly have
Ua,Jðkð0Þ j OÞ þUb,Jðkð0Þ j OÞ ¼WJð1Þ: ð49Þ
5. Initial Organizational Form
We now turn to the comparison of separate and joint operations for the
purpose of determining the optimal organizational form at date t ¼ 0.
40 We assume that the asset would be used by its original owner in case of disagreement.
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From the results in Section 2, we can write the value of the asset under
separate operations at date t ¼ 0
WSðkð0ÞÞ ¼ kað0Þ
r
ð1 Þ 
!a

  
1
, ð50Þ
From the results in Section 4, we have the corresponding value under
joint operations
WJð1Þ ¼
k
r
ð1 Þ 1 
!aa !
b
b
 ! 
1
1þ ðÞx^	J
h i
, ð51Þ
where
ðXÞ  1 2	
1þ 	
BðX Þ
AHðX Þ
 
1
1 BðXÞ  1, ð52Þ
and
 ¼ 
aa 
bb
1  
aa þ 
bb½ 
1 
 1

ð53Þ
as in (41). Joint operations will be chosen in preference to separate
operations at date t ¼ 0 when WJð1Þ WSðkð0ÞÞ. Hence,
Corollary 2. Joint operations will be chosen over separate operations at
date t ¼ 0 when
kað0Þ 1
!a

  
1
 k 1
!aa !
b
b
 ! 
1


1 1þ ðÞx^	J
h i
: ð54Þ
From inequality (54) we can see that
(i) An advantage of joint operations over separate operations is the
combination of the partners’ knowhow ðk > kað0ÞÞ.
(ii) A disadvantage of joint operations is the inability to have all
resources contributed by the low-cost partner
(!aa !
b
b > minf!a;!bg).
(iii) A disadvantage of joint operations is the moral hazard problem
[
a < 1 and 
b < 1 in  can be shown to decrease  below 1].
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(iv) Finally, an advantage of joint operations is the option value of
dissolving the venture and abandoning joint operations for sepa-
rate operations when the latter dominate. This advantage is
reflected in the factor ½1þ ðÞx^	J .
Interestingly, even if considerations (i) to (iii) were such that separate
operation of the asset by firm a dominates joint operations net of the
option value of dissolution, consideration (iv) may nonetheless impart a
preference for joint operations.
Note that there are no circumstances under which joint operations are
preceded by a phase of separate operations. Such an occurrence would
require inequality (54) to be false at the outset and become true after some
period of separate operations. But neither side of the inequality will
change during separate operations. This is because both knowhow and
learning conditions remain unchanged under separate operations. Thus,
should inequality (54) fail to hold at date t ¼ 0, and separate operations
therefore be chosen at the outset, the inequality will fail to hold for
all t > 0.
Furthermore, regardless of whether joint or separate operations dom-
inate, there are no circumstances under which the dominant form of
operations should be delayed. This is because not operating is never
worthwhile, as the values Vi,Sðkið0ÞÞ and Vi,JðxðtÞÞ in (10) and (37),
respectively, are always positive.41
6. The Duration of the Joint Venture
The duration of the joint venture is the time elapsed between the date t ¼ 0
at which the joint venture is formed and the date t ¼ t^ at which it is
dissolved. The latter is the time at which learning conditions reach the
state x^J . We establish the following comparative statics results, distinguish-
ing somewhat arbitrarily between the characteristics of the venture and
those of the partners.
Lemma 1. The duration of a joint venture is
(i) decreasing in the discount rate, r0,
(ii) decreasing in the intensity of failure, ,
(iii) decreasing in the underlying trend of learning conditions, ,
(iv) increasing in the underlying volatility of learning conditions, .
41 The constancy of yðtÞ under separate operations implies that there is no option value to waiting for an
improvement in learning conditions. See McDonald and Siegel (1986) for an analysis of the value of the
option of waiting to invest.
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The results are quite intuitive. Result (i) reflects the fact that a joint venture
can be viewed as an investment in transferring knowhow. The higher the
discount rate, the less valuable the future benefits to such transfer, and the
smaller the investment. A smaller investment takes the form of a shorter lived
joint venture. Result (ii) is similar to result (i). Liquidation renders worthless
the investment made in transferring knowhow. The higher the intensity of
failure, the higher the probability of liquidation and the smaller the invest-
ment. Result (iii) reflects the faster rise of learning conditions to the state x^J
that comes from a larger trend. Finally, result (iv) reflects the fact that
higher volatility makes the option to dissolve more valuable. The partners
are therefore less likely to ‘kill’ the option by dissolving the venture.
Lemma 2. The duration of a joint venture is
(i) increasing in the overall knowhow of the partners, k,
(ii) decreasing in the initial knowhow of the buying partner, kHð0Þ,
(iii) unaffected by the initial knowhow of the selling partner, kLð0Þ,
(iv) decreasing in the ease with which partner H acquires knowhow, fH ,
(v) unaffected by the ease with which partner L acquires knowhow, fL,
(vi) increasing in the cost of the buying partner, !H ,
(vii) decreasing in the cost of the selling partner, !L.
Again, the results are quite intuitive. Results (i) and (ii) reflect the fact
that the more knowhow there is for the buying partner to acquire, the
longer that partner will wish to remain in the venture. Result (iii) reflects
the fact that the initial knowhow of the selling partner has no effect on the
knowhow of the buying partner. Only the latter knowhow matters to the
decision to dissolve the joint venture. Results (iv) and (v) are the counter-
parts to results (ii) and (iii), applied to the partners’ ease of knowhow
acquisition. The faster the buying partner acquires knowhow, the shorter
the duration of the joint venture. How fast the buying partner acquires
knowhow depends on that partner’s ease of knowhow acquisition but not
on that of its partner. Results (vi) and (vii) reflect the cost of the dis-
crepancy in costs. The higher the cost of the buying partner, the longer
that partner wishes to share the cost of contributing resources with its
counterpart. The higher the cost of the selling partner, the sooner the
buying partner wishes to buy it out.
Upon forming the joint venture, the partners will wish to form an
expectation of the duration of the joint venture and to obtain some
measure of uncertainty of that duration. At the date t ¼ 0, the joint
venture has expected duration E0 ½^t and variance V0 ½^t given by42
42 See Cox and Miller (1984, p. 221) for the moments of the first passage time to an upper absorbing barrier
of an upward drifting geometric Brownian motion.
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E0 t^½  ¼ lnðx^JÞ
 2=2 and V0 t^½  ¼
2 lnðx^JÞ
2  2=2ð Þ3
, if > 2=2, ð55Þ
and E0 ½^t ! þ1 and V0 ½^t ! 1 if   2=2.43 Denoting by f0ðtÞ the
probability density function of the time to dissolution and by EDFðtÞ
the expected dissolution frequency of the venture, we have44
f0ðtÞ ¼ lnðx^JÞ

ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2t3
p exp  lnðx^JÞ  ð 
2=2Þt
22t
 2" #
ð56Þ
and
EDFðtÞ ¼N  lnðx^JÞ þ ð 
2=2Þt

ﬃﬃ
t
p
 
þ exp 2 lnðx^JÞð 
2=2Þ
2
 
N
 lnðx^JÞ  ð 2=2Þt

ﬃﬃ
t
p
 
,
ð57Þ
where Nð:Þ denotes the cumulative normal distribution.
7. Example
We illustrate selected results by way of a numerical example. We choose a
set of parameter values that generate duration E0½ t^  ¼ 7:25 years and
expected dissolution frequency at year 10 EDFð10Þ ¼ 81:6%, in line with
what appears to be the case for joint ventures.45 Figure 6 plots (a) the
probability density function of the time to dissolution, t^, and (b) its
expected dissolution frequency.
The parameter values correspond to a situation in which partner a has
both lower cost and lower initial knowhow than its counterpart b
ð!a ¼ 10, !b ¼ 25, kað0Þ ¼ 40, and kbð0Þ ¼ 60Þ. There is no overlap in
initial knowhow ð ¼ kað0Þ þ kbð0Þ ¼ 100Þ, so that a partner’s potential
gain in knowhow is the entirety of its partner’s knowhow. The partners
are otherwise identical, both in terms of the contributions they make to
the venture ða ¼ b ¼ 1=2Þ and in terms of their ease of knowhow
43 Note that, when   2=2, the probability of reaching the (finite) state x^J equals one despite the
expectation and variance of the random time at which that state is reached being infinite (Cox and
Miller, 1984, p. 221).
44 The expected dissolution frequency at date t is the probability that dissolution occurs at or before that
date. It can be viewed as the counterpart in joint ventures to the expected default frequency analyzed by
Huang and Huang (2002) and Leland (2004) in their assessment of structural asset pricing models of the
firm.
45 These values are close to those that are either reported in or can be inferred from Kogut (1991).
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acquisition ðfa ¼ fb ¼ 0:4Þ. Resource contributions and knowhow are
equally important ð ¼ 0:5Þ. Finally, r0 ¼ 8%,  ¼ 1%,  ¼ 0:1, and
 ¼ 0:1.
With the preceding parameter values, joint operations are preferred to
separate operations but only because of the option value of dissolution.46
(a)
(b)
Figure 6
Uncertainty in Joint Venture Duration, in the Baseline Case
(a) Probability density function of joint venture duration, f0(t). (b) Expected dissolution frequency,
EDF(t) (probability that dissolution occurs before date t). The horizontal axis shows time t in years.
46 Inequality (54) in Corollary 2 holds, but it would not hold were we to impose the condition ðÞ x^	J ¼ 0.
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The optimal contract consists of (i) an equal sharing rule ð
a ¼ 
b ¼ 1=2Þ
and (ii) a CCM exit rule with no transfer payment ð 0a ¼  0b ¼ 0Þ. The
buying partner, H, is partner a. Interestingly, when the venture is dis-
solved, partner a has acquired only gað^tÞ=½k  kað0Þ ¼ 56:73% of the
knowhow it can potentially acquire from partner b. Partner a chooses
to forego the remaining knowhow to avoid having to bear the costs of
joint operations, in the present case the cost of moral hazard and that of
working with a higher cost partner ð!a ¼ 10 < 25 ¼ !bÞ.
8. Moral Hazard
We conduct a detailed comparison of the results of Propositions 2
and 4. We have already mentioned the lower resources contributed by
the partners and the possibility for the high-cost partner to be the
superior user of the asset at dissolution in the discussion that followed
Proposition 4.
Another effect of moral hazard is to decrease the duration of the joint
venture.47 This can be seen by noting that (29) is identical to (42), with 1
in the former replaced by  in the latter. As   1 and the product
AHðÞGHðÞ increases in , we have x^J  x^J .48 The intuition of this
result is that decreased contributions by the partners diminish the profit-
ability and thus the duration of joint operations.
An immediate effect of the shorter duration of the joint venture in the
presence of moral hazard is the lower knowhow of the buying partner, H,
at dissolution. This can be shown formally by noting that the ratio
BðÞ=AHðÞ in (25) and (40) decreases in . A related effect is the
lower value of the joint venture at date t ¼ 0. As noted in Corollary 2,
that value in the presence of moral hazard is the RHS of (54). In the
absence of moral hazard, the value of the joint venture is identical to the
RHS of (54), with x^J replaced by x^J and  by 1. The desired result is an
immediate implication of the observation that =1 1þ ðÞx^	J
h i
increases in .49
Finally, as the LHS of (54) is the same regardless of the existence of
moral hazard, but the RHS is lower in the presence of moral hazard, we
conclude that moral hazard makes joint operations less likely to be
chosen in the first place.
We summarize the preceding results in Corollary 3.
47 Double moral hazard thus plays in joint ventures a role similar to that played by coordination costs in
mergers.
48 That   1 is shown in the Proof of Proposition 4.
49 We use the Envelope Theorem to ignore the effect of the change from x^J to x^J on the RHS of (54).
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Corollary 3. Moral hazard (i) makes joint operations less likely to be
chosen over separate operations at the outset, (ii) decreases the value of
the joint venture when joint operations are chosen, (iii) decreases the
resource contributions to the venture, (iv) shortens the duration of the
joint venture, (v) lowers the knowhow attained by the buying partner at
dissolution, and (vi) introduces the possibility for the high-cost partner to be
the superior user of the asset at dissolution.
The effects of moral hazard are substantial. Continuing with the exam-
ple presented in Section 7, the expected duration of the joint venture
would be ðE0 ½^t  E0 ½^tÞ=E0 ½^t ¼ 27:3% longer in the absence of moral
hazard. The expected dissolution frequency at year 10 would be
½EDF ð10Þ  EDFð10Þ=EDFð10Þ ¼ 16:67% lower. Finally, the kno-
whow gained by partner a at dissolution would be
½gað^tÞ  gað^tÞ=gað^tÞ ¼ 13:77% larger.
9. Testable Implications and Empirical Evidence
We now briefly consider some testable implications of our results. Per-
haps the most important implication is the prediction regarding the
identity of the buying partner at dissolution. We predict this to be the
low-cost partner for joint ventures that were in existence long enough for
the low-cost partner to have acquired most of its partner’s knowhow. It
may be the high-cost partner when the venture is relatively short-lived,
and the high-cost partner’s ease of knowhow acquisition is greater than
that of its counterpart. This prediction naturally begs the question of
what exactly defines the ‘cost’ of a partner and what distinguishes such
cost from the partner’s knowhow and from the asset in the venture. We
suggest that knowhow is what can be learned in the course of joint
operations, the asset is what can be bought by one partner from the
other, and cost is what can neither be learned nor be bought, at least at
reasonable cost, within reasonable time, and with no marked decline in
value as it is acquired.50 This definition in many ways recalls that of
corporate advantage, often associated with ‘‘core competencies.’’51 We
would therefore predict that in joint ventures in which one partner con-
siders the venture’s business part of its core operations whereas the other
does not, the former partner is the likely acquiror at dissolution. The joint
50 How long is ‘reasonable time’ of course depends on the knowhow to be acquired. A long-lived venture
may therefore be considered one that lasts longer than that period.
51 For a discussion of corporate advantage, see for example Collis and Montgomery (1998). For a discus-
sion of core competencies, see Prahalad and Hamel (1990).
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venture between BMW and Rolls-Royce mentioned in the Introduction
appears to conform to that view, as do the large number of joint ventures
that are essentially devices through which one partner exits a business no
longer considered central to its operations. Numerous examples of such
ventures are reported in Nanda and Williamson (1995) and include
Whirlpool and Phillips in white goods, Corning Glass and Ciba-Geigy
in medical diagnostics, and Dresser and Komatsu in construction equip-
ment.
Another testable implication of our result is that learning races may not
be as widespread as commonly believed. This is because exit contracts
constrain bargaining, thereby limiting the scope for the partners to exploit
any increased bargaining power they may derive from learning. Although
the optimal contract we have derived is somewhat unusual in that it
involves a transfer payment from one partner to the other over and
above the price paid for the selling partner’s share of the venture, it
reduces to a relatively common version of the CCM when the partners’
contributions are identical.52
A set of testable implications relates to the duration of the joint
venture. There appears to exist little empirical evidence, supportive or
otherwise, regarding most predictions, but approximate forms of two
predictions have been tested. The first prediction is the longer duration
of joint ventures in which more knowhow potentially can be acquired by
the buying partner (@ t^=@k > 0). The second is the shorter duration of
joint ventures in which the buying partner has greater ease of acquiring
knowhow (@ t^=@fH < 0). Reuer, Zollo, and Singh (2002) study the like-
lihood of reorganization or buyout of equity and non-equity alliances in
the biotechnology industry.53 They find this likelihood to be lower the
greater the alliance’s division of labor, that is, the greater the extent to
which the partners perform different tasks within the alliance. The greater
the alliance’s division of labor, the greater, presumably, the discrepancy
in the partners’ initial knowhow regarding the different tasks, and the
more knowhow potentially can be acquired. Park and Russo (1996) find
that integrative joint ventures, that is, joint ventures that have their
manufacturing facilities jointly built and operated by the partners, have
shorter duration to buyout. Partners working side by side in a manufac-
turing facility presumably can learn more easily from each other, in
contrast to partners working in separate facilities (what Park and Russo
call sequential joint ventures, which they find have longer duration).
52 Recall that  0a ¼  0b ¼ 0 when a ¼ b ¼ 1=2.
53 A joint venture is an equity alliance.
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10. Conclusion
We summarize the main findings of our analysis and discuss its limita-
tions.
We believe our analysis has four main findings: that the acquisition of
knowhow makes every joint venture temporary; that the partner that is
bought out at dissolution need not be viewed as the losing party; that
learning races may not be as widespread as commonly believed; and, most
importantly perhaps, that it is possible to form an expectation of the
duration of the joint venture at the outset and to identify the buying
partner.
Our first finding, that the acquisition of knowhow makes every joint
venture temporary, reflects the effects of knowhow acquisition on the
balance of benefits and costs in the joint venture. The more knowhow has
been acquired, the fewer the benefits of joint operations relative to
separate operations. Because the costs of joint operations are unaffected,
there comes a time at which the joint venture is dissolved.
An alternative interpretation is that the joint venture is an arrangement
for transferring knowhow from one partner to the other to capitalize on
the latter partner’s lower cost or greater ease of knowhow acquisition.
The joint venture is dissolved once the desired transfer of knowhow has
taken place. Dissolution takes the form of the buyout of the inferior
partner by its superior counterpart.
Our second finding is that the partner that is bought out at dissolution
need not be viewed as the losing party. Despite being made the inferior
partner by the process of transferring knowhow, the partner that is
bought out is willing to take part in this process, because it shares in the
ensuing increase in value through the buyout price it receives for its stake
in the venture.
Our third finding is that there exists a contract that succeeds in making
exit renegotiation proof and thereby precludes learning races. In view of
the extensive discussion regarding learning races, this is a somewhat
unexpected and relatively important result. The contract we derive resem-
bles the cake-cutting mechanism commonly found in joint venture agree-
ments and effectively reduces to a version of it in the case where the
partners’ contributions to the joint venture are identical and the partners
hold equal shares of the venture. This finding suggests that the purpose of
the various exit clauses found in joint venture contracts may be to con-
strain bargaining over exit conditions, thereby denying the parties the
incentive to acquire knowhow for the sole purpose of affecting negotia-
tion, that is, to engage in learning races.
Finally, our fourth finding is that it is possible to form an expectation
of the duration of the joint venture at the outset and to identify the buying
partner. The buying partner is the superior partner at dissolution but need
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not have been the superior user at date t ¼ 0. The buying partner is made
superior user by its lower cost, its higher knowhow at the time of
dissolution, or both. Duration and identity are related. The buying
partner is necessarily the low-cost partner in a joint venture that is
long-lived, for a long-lived venture provides each partner with the oppor-
tunity to acquire most of its counterpart’s knowhow. In contrast, when
moral hazard and the discrepancy in costs make the joint venture short
lived, the buying partner may be the high-cost partner. The high-cost
partner may be the superior user despite its higher cost, if that higher cost
is offset by still higher knowhow, attained by virtue of the high-cost
partner’s greater ease of knowhow acquisition.
Turning to the limitations of our analysis, we believe that there are two
main limitations. The first limitation is in the indispensable nature of the
asset: no revenues can be produced without the asset. This implies that the
superior user at dissolution cannot simply walk away from the venture
and engage in separate operations using an alternative asset. To engage in
separate operations, the superior user must buy out its inferior counter-
part. This ensures that the latter partner shares in the gains made possible
by the former partner’s increased knowhow. Absent the need for the
superior user to buy out its inferior counterpart, it may be possible for
the superior user to avoid sharing the gains from increased knowhow. In
such case, the inferior partner may no longer be willing to enter into the
joint venture or, should it do so, it is unlikely to contribute its knowhow
to the venture to the same extent.
The second limitation is in the limited operations of the two partners: the
partners’ only operations are those combined in the joint venture. Such a
situation is not very common in practice, where most firms engaged in a joint
venture likely have extensive fully-owned operations besides. To the extent
that externalities exist between fully- and jointly-owned operations, the
ability of the inferior partner to share in the gains from increased knowhow
may be much diminished and thus its willingness to enter into and contribute
to the joint venture. An offsetting effect, however, is that the inferior
partner’s fully-owned operations may profit from the knowhow that same
partner acquires from the superior partner. Clearly, the resulting interactions
are markedly more complex than those in this article. An analysis that
addresses both limitations is important but best left for further work.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. As in Lando (1994), discounting when liquidation occurs with
intensity  is analogous to discounting at the sum of the short rate and that same intensity.
Formally, we use
Et 1ð<tÞ
  ¼ expðtÞ , ð58Þ
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to obtain
Vi,Sðkið0ÞÞ ¼ max
ei
Et
Z þ1
t
expðr0þÞðtÞ Rðei,kið0ÞÞ  CiðeiÞ½  d
  	
, ð59Þ
¼ Rðei,kið0ÞÞ  CiðeiÞ½  1
r0 þ  : ð60Þ
Maximizing, we obtain ei,S ¼ kið0Þð=!iÞ1=1 . Substituting, we have
Vi,Sðkið0ÞÞ ¼ kið0Þ
r0 þ 


1   11
!

1
i
0
@
1
A: ð61Þ
Simplifying and defining r  r0 þ  gives (10). &
Proof of Proposition 2. To simplify the notation in this proof, we shall refrain from using
primes to denote the first-best case. By analogy to the derivation in the Proof of Proposition
1, we have
WJ ðxðtÞÞ max
ejt¼0
Et
Z t^
t
exprðtÞ RJ ðeÞ  CaðeaÞ  CbðebÞ½ d
" #(
þEt
h
exprðt^tÞ VH,SðkHðt^ ÞÞ
io
: ð62Þ
Let ftðtðx*ÞÞ denote the density of tðx*Þ  infft j xðtÞ ¼ x*g conditional on the informa-
tion known at date t. The Laplace transform of ftðtðx*ÞÞ is the probability weighted discount
factor for the value of $1 received at tðx*Þ
Z 1
t
exprðtðx
*ÞtÞ ftðtðx*ÞÞdtðx*Þ ¼ xðtÞ
x*

 	
, ð63Þ
where
	  2 2=2 þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ð 2=2Þ2 þ 2r2
q 
: ð64Þ
Note that 	 > 1. Using (63) we can write
WJ ðxðtÞÞ¼max
ejt¼0 ,x^
RJ ðeÞCaðeaÞCbðebÞ½ =r 1 xðtÞ
x^
 	( )
þVH,SðkHðt^ÞÞ xðtÞ
x^
 	( )
: ð65Þ
Proceeding backwards in time, we first characterize the partners’ jointly optimal dissolu-
tion time.
Given that kH ð^tÞ ¼ k  ½k  kHð0Þð1 fHÞ=ðx^ fHÞ, we have @½kH^ ð^tÞ=@x^ ¼
½k  kH ð^tÞ=ðx^ fHÞ.
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Differentiating (65) w.r.t. x^, we have
@WJ ðxðtÞÞ
@x^
¼ 1
x^ðx^i  fHÞ
xðtÞ
x^
 	
	ðx^ fHÞ RJ ðeÞ  CaðeaÞ  CbðebÞ½ 
r

 ½x^þ 	ðx^ fHÞVH,SðkHðt^ÞÞ þ x^VH,SðkÞ

:
ð66Þ
Given that VH,SðkH ð^tÞÞ < VH,SðkÞ, the f.o.c. for x^ yields
F ðx^Þ ¼ 1 fH
	

 
VH,S k kHð0Þ
 
VH,SðkÞ  RJ ðeÞ  CaðeaÞ  CbðebÞ½ =r
  , ð67Þ
where
F ðx^Þ  ðx^ fHÞ
2
ð1þ 	Þx^ 	fH
ð68Þ
if
½RJ ðeÞCaðeaÞCbðebÞ
r
< VH,SðkÞ and x^! þ1 otherwise.
We then determine the partners’ resource contributions.Using theEnvelopeTheorem,we have
dWJðxðtÞÞ=dei ¼ @½RJðeÞ  CaðeaÞ  CbðebÞ=@ei 1 ½xðtÞ=x^	
h i
, and the f.o.c. for ei directly
yields (24). With (24) for partner a and partner b, we obtain (22). With (24) we also obtain
RJ ðeÞ  CaðeaÞ  CbðebÞ ¼ 1 ð ÞsðeÞ k1: ð69Þ
With (69) and (65), we obtain (21). Also, using (69) and (67), we have that x^ can be written as
in (29), with AHðXÞ defined in (26). Using ki ð^tÞ ¼ k  ½k  kHð0Þð1 fiÞ=ðx^ fHÞ and (29),
we obtain ki ð^tÞ given in (25). The identity of H then follows.
We now show by contradiction that x^ is always finite: Assume that x^! þ1. Then
kiðtÞjt!þ1 ¼ k. It follows that SiðtÞjt!þ1 ¼ ð!j=!iÞ=1 . Hence, the superior user of the
asset at dissolution, H, is such that !H ¼ minf!a;!bg in case of very late dissolution. Now,
with (69), ½RJðeÞ  CaðeaÞ  CbðebÞ=r < VH,SðkÞ when
!H
!L
<1: ð70Þ
But if !H ¼ minf!a;!bg, then (70) holds. Hence, ½RJðeÞ  CaðeaÞ  CbðebÞ =r < VH,SðkÞ
and so x^ is finite, which is a contradiction. Therefore, x^ is always finite.
We now show by contradiction that H is such that !H ¼ minf!a;!bg: Assume that H is
such that !H ¼ maxf!a;!bg. Then ½RJðeÞ  CaðeaÞ  CbðebÞ=r ¼
k=rð1 Þ

=!aa !
b
b
=1
, whereas VH,SðkÞ ¼ k=rð1 Þ =maxf!a;!bgð Þ

1. Hence,
½RJðeÞ  CaðeaÞ  CbðebÞ=r > VH,SðkÞ and so x^ is infinite. This contradicts the previously
proved fact that x^ is finite. Therefore, H is such that !H ¼ minf!a;!bg. &
Proof of Propositions 3 and 4. Using (63) and (64) we can write the analogue to (65)
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Vi,J ðxðtÞÞ ¼ max
eijt¼0 ,x^i

iRJ ðeÞ  CiðeiÞ½ 
r
1 xðtÞ
x^
 	( )
þ V *i ðkHðt^ ÞÞ
xðtÞ
x^
 	( )
, ð71Þ
with x^  minfx^a; x^bg.
Proceeding backwards in time, we first characterize each partner’s privately optimal dissolu-
tion time. Given that kH ð^tiÞ ¼ k  ½k  kHð0Þð1 fHÞ=ðx^i  fHÞ, we have
@=@x^i½kH ð^tiÞ ¼ ½k  kH ð^tiÞ=ðx^i  fHÞ. Differentiating (71) w.r.t. x^i, we have
@Vi,J ðxðtÞÞ
@x^i
¼ 1
x^iðx^i  fHÞ
xðtÞ
x^i
 	
	ðx^i  fHÞ 
iRJ ðeÞ  CiðeiÞ½ 
r

½x^i þ 	ðx^i  fHÞV *i ðkHðt^iÞÞ þ x^iV *i ðkÞ

: ð72Þ
Given that V *i ðkð^tiÞÞ < V *i ðkÞ, the f.o.c. for x^i yields
F ðx^iÞ ¼ 1 fH
	

 
 Hi VH,S
k kHð0Þ
 
V *i ðkÞ  
iRJ ðeÞ  CiðeiÞ½ =r
  , ð73Þ
where
F ðx^iÞ  ðx^i  fHÞ
2
ð1þ 	Þx^i  	fH
ð74Þ
if ½
iRJðeÞ  CiðeiÞ=r < V*i ðkÞ and x^i ! þ1 otherwise. A necessary condition for the
contract 
i and  
0
i , 
H
i
 
to be renegotiation proof is that the two partners’ privately optimal
dissolution times coincide: t^a ¼ t^b. This is equivalent to x^a ¼ x^b. Using (73), this is in turn
equivalent to
 0i ¼

iRJ ðeÞ  CiðeiÞ½ 
r
  Hi
RJ ðeÞ  CaðeaÞ  CbðebÞ½ 
r
: ð75Þ
We then determine the partners’ resource contributions. Using the Envelope Theorem, we
have dVi,JðxðtÞÞ=dei ¼ @½
iRJðeÞ  CiðeiÞ=@ei 1 xðtÞx^
h i	 	
, and the f.o.c. for ei directly
yields (39). With (39) for partner a and partner b, we obtain (38). With (39) we also obtain

iRJ ðeÞ  CiðeiÞ ¼ 
i 1 ið ÞsðeÞ k1: ð76Þ
With (76) and (71), we obtain (37). Also, using (73), (75), and (76), we have that x^ can be
written as in (42), where AiðXÞ and GiðXÞ are defined in (26) and (28), respectively, and  is
given by (41). Using ki ð^tÞ ¼ k  ½k  kHð0Þð1 fiÞ=ðx^ fHÞ, (19), and (42), we obtain ki ð^tÞ
given in (40). The identity of H then follows.
We now show by contradiction that x^ is always finite: Assume that x^! þ1. Then
kiðtÞjt!þ1 ¼ k. It follows that SiðtÞjt!þ1 ¼ ð!j=!iÞ=1 . Hence, the superior user of the
asset at dissolution, H, is such that !H ¼ minf!a;!bg in case of very late dissolution. Now,
with (76), ½RJðeÞ  CaðeaÞ  CbðebÞ=r < VH,SðkÞ when
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!H
!L
< 
 1L : ð77Þ
Given that the profit ratio under the first- and second-best is
Rfirst=second 
RJ ðeÞ  CaðeaÞ  CbðebÞ½ jfirst-best
RJ ðeÞ  CaðeaÞ  CbðebÞ½ jsecond-best
 1, ð78Þ
and that, with (69) and (76), we have Rfirst=second ¼ ð1=Þ=1 , it follows that   1. But if
!H ¼ minf!a;!bg, then (77) holds. Hence, ½RJðeÞ  CaðeaÞ  CbðebÞ=r < VH,SðkÞ and so x^
is finite, which is a contradiction. Therefore, x^ is always finite.
Unlike the case of Proposition 2, it is no longer the case that H is always such
that !H ¼ minf!a;!bg. Attempting to use the same proof by contradiction as in
the proof of Proposition 2 above would require ½RJðeÞ  CaðeaÞ  CbðebÞ=r ¼
k
r
ð1 
aa  
bbÞ 
aa 
bb
 
=!aa !
b
b
  
1
to be smaller than VH,SðkÞ ¼
k
r
ð1 Þðmaxf! a;! bgÞ 1 . However, there is no clear ranking of
½RJðeÞ  CaðeaÞ  CbðebÞ=r and VH,SðkÞ, as was the case in the proof of Proposition 2.
Thus, it is possible for either partner to be the superior user at dissolution, depending on
whether Sa ð^tÞjH¼a in (43) is greater or smaller than 1.
Finally, we derive the second-best sharing rule, 
i, and the optimal exit rule,  
0
i , 
H
i
 
.
Recall that 
a þ 
b ¼ 1,  0a þ  0b ¼ 0, and  Ha þ  Hb ¼ 1. The total value of the joint venture
is therefore WJðxðtÞÞ ¼ Va,JðxðtÞÞ þ Vb,JðxðtÞÞ. It is also the case that
V*a ðkð^tÞÞ þ V*b ðkð^tÞÞ ¼ VH,Sðkð^tÞÞ. Using the Envelope Theorem, we have
dWJðxðtÞÞ=d
i ¼ @½RJðeÞ  CaðeaÞ  CbðebÞ=@
if1 ½xðtÞ=x^	g. From (75), we have
@ RJ ðeÞCaðeaÞCbðebÞ½ 
@
i
¼ 1
aa
bbð Þð1Þ
i

i
 j

j

 
ði jÞ
 
sðeÞ k1: ð79Þ
Solving for 
i and 
j , we obtain the sharing rule (33). We then have
@½RJðeÞ  CaðeaÞ  CbðebÞ=@ Hi ¼ 0, so dWJðxðtÞÞ=d Hi ¼ 0. Therefore, a contract 
i and
ð 0i , Hi Þ maximizes WJðxðtÞÞ and is renegotiation proof if it satisfies (33) and (75). Now,
with (76) and (38), (75) can be written as (35).
The payoffs from the CCM. We consider a slightly more general form of the CCM, which
allows for payments  0i and  
0
j ¼  0i received by partners i and j, respectively. Under the
CCM, partner j chooses an exit price WCCM at the time of dissolution. Partner i can then
either (i) buy out partner j for 
jW
CCM or (ii) sell out to partner j for 
iW
CCM. The values
to partner i, including the fixed payments, are then Vi,Sðki ð^tÞÞ þ  0i  
jWCCM when buying
out partner j and  0i þ 
iWCCM when selling out to partner j.
If Vi,Sðki ð^tÞÞ  Vj,Sðkj ð^tÞÞ, partner j best chooses an exit price
WCCM ¼ Vi,Sðkiðt^ÞÞ, ð80Þ
In this case, partner i chooses to buy out partner j and
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V *i ðkiðt^ÞÞ ¼  0i þ 
iWCCM, ð81Þ
V *j ðkiðt^ÞÞ ¼  0j þ 
jWCCM: ð82Þ
If Vi,Sðki ð^tÞÞ < Vj,Sðkj ð^tÞÞ, partner j chooses an exit price
WCCM ¼ Vi,Sðkiðt^ ÞÞ: ð83Þ
In this case, partner i chooses to sell out to partner j and
V *i ðkjðt^ ÞÞ ¼  0i þ 
iWCCM, ð84Þ
V *j ðkjðt^ ÞÞ ¼  0j þ Vj,Sðkjðt^ ÞÞ  
iWCCM: ð85Þ
Partner j’s best choice is therefore always to choose an exit price WCCM ¼ Vi,Sðkið t^ ÞÞ.
The payoffs to partners i and j are therefore
V *i ðkHðt^ ÞÞ ¼  0i þ 
iVi,Sðkiðt^ ÞÞ, ð86Þ
V *j ðkHðt^ ÞÞ ¼
 0j þ 
jVi,Sðkiðt^ ÞÞ if Vi,Sðkiðt^ ÞÞ  Vj,Sðkjðt^ ÞÞ,
and partner i buys out partner j;
 0j þ Vj,Sðkjðt^ ÞÞ  
i Vi,Sðkiðt^ ÞÞ if Vi,Sðkiðt^ ÞÞ < Vj,Sðkjðt^ ÞÞ,
and partner i sells out to partner j.
8>>><
>>>: ð87Þ
Note that it is always the superior user of the asset at dissolution, partnerH, who buys out
its counterpart. From (86) and (87), the more general form of the CCM amounts to an exit
rule
 0i , 
H
i
 
,  0j , 
H
j
 
¼
 0i ,
i
 
,  0j ,
j
 
, if ði, jÞ ¼ ðH,LÞ
 0i ,
i
Vi,S ðkiðt^ÞÞ
Vj,S ðkjðt^ÞÞ
 
,  0j ,1 
i Vi,S ðkiðt^ÞÞVj,S ðkjðt^ÞÞ
 
if (i, j)=(H,L)
8<
: ð88Þ
Under the more usual form of the CCM, which does not allow for the payments  0i and
 0j , the exit rule is as above but with  
0
i ¼  0j ¼ 0. &
Proof of Lemmas 1 and 2. For all  2 fr;; 2=2; k; kHð0Þ; kLð0Þ; fH ; fL;!H ;!Lg, we have
signð@ t^=@Þ ¼ signð@x^J=@Þ.
For  2 fr;;2=2g, we have @x^J=@ ¼ @x^J=@	 @	=@, and we establish
@x^J
@	
¼  x^J
	ð1þ 	Þ½AHðÞ  1 < 0: ð89Þ
The term 	 is the positive root of 	22=2þ 	ð 2=2Þ  r ¼ 0 and 	 > 1. Let
  ð 2=2Þ2 þ 22r.
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Then, using the fact that ð	2 þ  2=2Þ ¼ 1=2, we have
@	
@r
¼ 1
1=2
> 0,
@	
@
¼  	
1=2
< 0, and
@	
@ð2=2Þ ¼ 
	ð	  1Þ
1=2
< 0: ð90Þ
Therefore, @x^J=@r < 0, @x^J=@ > 0, and @x^J=@ð2=2Þ > 0.
Using (41), for  2 fk; kHð0Þ; kL< ð0Þ; fL;!H ;!Lg, we have @=@ ¼ 0.
Using (27), we have @BðÞ=@ ¼ 0 for  2 fk; kHð0Þ; kLð0Þ; fLg, @BðÞ=@!H<0, and
@BðÞ=@!L > 0.
Using (28), we then have @GHðÞ=@k > 0, @GHðÞ=@kHð0Þ < 0, @GHðÞ=@kLð0Þ ¼ 0,
@GHðÞ=@fH < 0, @GHðÞ=@!H > 0, and @GHðÞ=@!L < 0.
From (26) and (42), x^J ¼ ð1þ 	ÞGHðÞ þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ð1þ 	Þ2G2HðÞ þ 2fHGHðÞ
q
þ fH . We there-
fore have @x^J=@k > 0, @x^J=@kH ð0Þ < 0, @x^J=@kLð0Þ ¼ 0, @x^J=@fL ¼ 0, @x^J=@!H > 0, and
@x^J=@!L < 0.
For fH , from (5) and (6) we have @kHðtÞ=@fH ¼ gHðtÞ=ðxðtÞ  fHÞ > 0 and
@kLðtÞ=@fH ¼ 0. So @V *i ðkHðtÞÞ=@ fH ¼  Hi VH,SðgHðtÞÞ=ðxðtÞ  fHÞ > 0 whereas
@½
iRJðeÞ  CiðeiÞ=@fH ¼ 0, for i 2 fa,bg. Therefore from (71), we have @x^i=@fH  0, for
i 2 fa,bg. Hence, @x^J=@fH  0.
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